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ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RESOURCES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
1
Nicholas Barr
I  THE BACKDROP
This paper discusses the funding of higher education, starting (section II)
with the economic theoretical answers to a number of key questions.  Section
III sets out alternative funding packages, and section IV considers recent
developments in a number of countries.
To make such a vast topic manageable, the paper is limited in several
ways.  It discusses the funding but not the production of higher education.
It does not discuss the nature of the 'product', nor the specific issues
raised by the funding of research.  It looks only at advanced industrialised
economies.
2  Finally, it attempts to be systematic in surveying broad options,
but not in surveying countries.
Since policy can usefully be assessed only against stated aims, a word
is needed about objectives.    Macro efficiency aims relate to the total
quantity of resources devoted to higher education, i.e. to the size of the
sector.   Micro efficiency is concerned with the division of total higher
education resources between teaching and research and between different
subject areas, and with the quality of the output and the extent to which it
satisfies the demands of its three major constituencies, students, employers
and government.  Equity aims relate to the distribution of higher education
by socioeconomic group.  Improving access for students from disadvantaged
backgrounds depends on the organisation both of higher education and of the
school system.  Thus equity includes discussion of how resources should be2
divided between higher education and policies to promote access earlier in the
system.
UK policy is concerned particularly with macro efficiency (e.g expansion
of the higher education system) and with improving access.  Other countries,
such as the USA, with large systems and a fairly broad class composition are
more concerned with aspects of micro efficiency, most particularly the quality
of education and its contribution to broader aims such as output growth.
These different concerns should not be surprising, since they follow
fairly directly from the different nature of the two systems.  Large taxpayer
subsidies (for tuition fees and/or living costs) create supply-side
constraints because of the desire to contain public spending.  Where, as in
Britain, qualified students have no automatic entitlement to a university
place, the constraint takes the form of a view (typically by the Treasury)
about student numbers.  The result is a high-quality system, but one which (at
least by admission standards in other countries) turns away qualified
applicants.  In countries where students have an entitlement (explicit or
implicit) to a place, the impact of cost containment is mainly on quality.
With less public funding per student, as in the USA, there are no externally
imposed supply-side constraints.  However, unless limited taxpayer funding is
sufficiently redistributive, students from lower-income backgrounds will be
deterred from applying.
Thus high subsidies can harm access on the supply side, but their
absence can harm it on the demand side.  This painful tension highlights the
need for a clear view of objectives and of a policy strategy to fulfil them.
II  ECONOMIC THEORY
This section summarises the answers economic theory suggests to three key
questions.3
Should Higher Education Be Subsidised?
Should funding be primarily public, as in the UK till relatively recently, or
substantially private, as is more the case in the USA?  There is a strong
presumption that higher education should be subsidised, but it important to
be clear about why quantification is problematic.  The investment case for
higher education rests on the (usually unstated) assumption that it increases
individual productivity.  The screening hypothesis argues that post-primary
education is associated with increased productivity, but does not cause it
(for surveys, see Blaug (1976, 1985)).  The hypothesis argues, first, that
education beyond a basic level does not increase individual productivity and,
second, that firms seek high-ability workers but are unable, ex ante, to
distinguish them from those with low ability.  The problem is similar to
adverse selection in insurance markets, or more generally to 'lemons'
(Akerlof, 1970), in the sense that one side of the market has more information
than the other.  The validity of the hypothesis is an empirical issue which
is undecided and likely to remain so, since individual productivity is
determined in part by unmeasurable influences like natural ability and family
background.
Alongside the screening arguments are questions about externalities.
Though belief in the external benefits of education is widespread, again
measurement problems make definitive answer impossible.  The heart of the
difficulty is the inability to measure the tendency for the education of
individual A to increase B's productivity.  Estimates of private rates of
return are suspect because, of necessity, they omit non-money returns such as
job satisfaaction.  Estimates of the social rate of return are doubly suspect:
they omit non-money returns and (since no other procedure is possible) also
ignore the screening problem.
There is one other potential external benefit.  Unless the extreme
version of the screening hypothesis holds, higher education raises a student's
earnings and, thereby, increases his/her future tax payments.  In the absence
of any subsidy, an individual's investment in a degree would confer a4
'dividend' on future taxpayers.  This line of argument can be used to justify
subsidising any type of investment which raises future income;  that is
precisely what usually happens through the tax system, at least so far as
business investment is concerned.  The 'tax dividend' point gives an
efficiency case for some subsidy, but it is not possible to show how much.
Should Higher Education Be Centrally Planned?
Should funds be allocated to institutions by government (the main channel in
Europe), or via students and other consumers of higher-education services, as
in the pure vouchers model and, up to a point, with private universities in
the USA?  A second, and related, question is whether there should be different
answers for teaching and research.  There are two strands to the argument:
the bureaucratic nature of central planning;  and the fact that there are
better methods for allocating resources to higher education.
In Britain, the University Grants Committee (UGC), which until 1990
channelled public resources to universities, was increasingly criticised
(Barnes and Barr, 1988, Ch. 3).  The core argument against central planning
is that central monitoring of university activities requires large amounts of
information:  and that information is costly to acquire, can in many cases not
be measured, and is often subverted by the individuals supplying it to the
central planning authority.
Such costs might be inevitable if other solutions were less efficient.
Though the matter is controversial, there are several reasons for believing
that students and other demanders of higher education services (in sharp
contrast with the case of school education) are better regarded as well-
informed than ill-informed, making consumer sovereignty a useful instrument.
Information is available, and more can be made available.  The information is
generally simple enough for the student to understand and evaluate.  The5
     
3 For further discussion, see Cave, Dodsworth and Thompson
(1992), Johnes (1992) and various of the other articles in the
same issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
student has time to acquire the information he/she needs, and time to seek
advice.  Finally, it should be noted that students make choices already.
3
A separate issue is whether students are more capable than planners of
making choices which conform with the needs of the economy?  All the available
evidence (Ahamad (1973);  Gannicott and Blaug (1973);  Psacharopoulos and
Woodhall (1985, Ch. 4)) highlights the failures of manpower planning.  As an
anecdotal example from Canada in the early 1980s, the graduates in greatest
demand were those with degrees in philosophy, since one of the leading edges
in information technology was 'fuzzy logic'.  Philosophy departments in
Britain at the time were under serious threat from the central planners.
A strong case can be made for a move away from central planning towards
a suitably regulated market system for allocating resources towards and within
higher education.
How Should Student Loans Be Designed?
If there are to be student loans (as in an increasing majority of OECD
countries) what is their optimal design?  A key distinction is between
mortgage-type loans, with repayment in fixed instalments over a fixed period,
and income-contingent loans, whose repayment takes the form of x per cent of
the individual borrower's subsequent annual income, making the repayment
period endogenous.  A second key issue is whether students borrow from the
government or the private sector.
There are strong arguments for income-contingent repayments.  They offer
the borrower insurance against potential future poverty, a feature of greater
relevance the higher the applicant's degree of risk aversion.  With mortgage
loans, in contrast, students bear a much higher fraction of the risk, thus
deterring applicants, particularly from disadvantaged backgrounds (Bennett,6
     
4 Robbins (1980, p. 35) was eventually converted to this
policy.
Glennerster and Nevinson, 1992).  This is inefficient because it wastes talent
and inequitable because it reduces intergenerational mobility.
Mortgage loans create problems also on the supply side.  In the absence
of slavery, lending for educational purposes is risky, since there is no
security.  The resulting capital-market imperfection leads to a shortage of
loan capital for educational investment.  The point is well-known.  Friedman
(1962) noted the riskiness of student loans and pointed out that,
'[t]he device adopted to meet the corresponding problem for other risky
investments is equity investment plus limited liability on the part of
shareholders.  The counter-part for education would be to "buy" a share
in an individual's earning prospects [and] to advance him the funds
needed to finance his training ... (p. 103).
'The individual ... would agree to pay to the government in each future
year a specified percentage of his earnings in excess of a specified
sum for each $1000 that he received (p. 105).
Equity considerations, also of venerable pedigree, point in the same
direction.  Glennerster, Merrett and Wilson (1968, p. 26), starting from a
predisposition towards tax-funding, point out that higher education, though
publicly funded,
'is reserved for a small and highly selected group.... It is
exceptionally expensive.... [And] education confers benefits which
reveal themselves in the form of higher earnings.  A graduate tax would
enable the community to recover the value of the resources devoted to
higher education from those who have themselves derived such
substantial benefit from it.'
Despite their very different starting points, the ability-to-pay
approach in the latter quote and the benefit principle implicit in the
Friedman quote lead to identical policy prescriptions.
4
Given the UK objective of expansion, a second key aspect of policy
design is that the source of borrowing, to the extent possible, should be the
private sector.  In theoretical terms the source of funds should not matter.
Suppose it is efficient to expand higher education, and that students borrow
from public funds.  If additional public borrowing crowds out private7
     
5 For further discussion of loan regimes, see Barr (1989,
1991) and Barden, Barr and Higginson (1991).
investment, it will only be less-efficient private investment which is crowded
out -- a result which is itself efficient.  That conclusion, however, rests
on stringent assumptions, in particular that government and taxpayers must be
rational and well-informed.  Neither is true.  Public funding requires that
taxation is higher than would otherwise be the case, with possible
disincentive effects;  and higher public spending may affect financial and
foreign-exchange markets.  If students borrow from private funds no issue of
taxation arises, and adverse incentives are minimised.  Separately, it can be
argued that diversifying the sources of funding contributes to the
independence of higher education.
5
III  ALTERNATIVE POLICY PACKAGES
Table 1 sets out a simple framework for analysing funding sources.  The
columns show different sources of support.  The three major beneficiaries of
higher education, are students, their employers and 'society', the last
represented by government.  The first three columns therefore refer to
STUDENTS (taken to include parents, acting on behalf of their children), the
PRIVATE SECTOR (notably employers) and the TAXPAYER (including, for example,
the Funding Councils and Research Councils in the UK and the National Science
Foundation in the USA).  The fourth column contains other sources of student
support, in particular the educational institutions themselves and other
private donors (e.g. the Ford Foundation), which can act as surrogates for
agents in the first three columns.  The different types of income, shown in
the left-hand column, fall into three categories:  TRANSFERS;  CURRENT
EARNINGS;  and LOANS, which are repaid out of future earnings.
Funding Institutions
The major source of transfers to institutions are block recurrent grants (e.g.
funding from the former UGC in the UK), capital grants, and tax expenditures
(e.g. universities' charitable status).  The major sources of earnings are8
tuition fees, which can be paid by students, by sponsoring firms, by
government (e.g. the Higher Education Funding Councils in the UK), or by other
outside bodies;  from research contracts from industry or government, or from
abroad;  and from other commercial activities (e.g. the use of university
property for conferences).  A third, though typically smaller, source of
income is through loans.
In policy terms, institutions can be funded in either or both of two
generic ways:  directly (e.g. via a block grant);  or through students and
other demanders of higher education services, e.g. via fees and user charges.
Model 1:  direct funding of institutions:  this is the common model in
mainland Europe, where resources, by and large, are channelled to institutions
in the form of transfers (line 1), usually tax funded (column C), with low or
no fees for students.  In Britain also, until recently, tax funding with low
fees for home students was the norm.
Model 2:  funding institutions via students and other demanders of
higher education services:  with substantial private funding, as with private
universities in the USA, universities receive much of their income from fees,
research grants and contracts, and commercial activities, i.e. line 2, columns
A and B.
A variant of model 2 is the vouchers model, the utility of which depends
on the extent to which student choices are regarded as superior to those of
planners.  In the simplest model, the state gives students tax-funded vouchers
which they spend at the institution of their choice, thus combining taxpayer
support (column C) with funding mainly through institutional earnings (line
2), hence without the need for the apparatus of central planning.  The model
is very flexible.  It is both possible and desirable to give larger vouchers
to students from poorer backgrounds.  If it is thought that some subjects
(classics, perhaps) are less suitable to competitive behaviour by institutions
than others (economics, accounting) it is possible to issue vouchers tied to9
subjects (or institutions) which one wishes to protect.  Vouchers can also be
issued by private firms, for instance tenable at a local institution.
With vouchers, in short, the system can be given any desired
redistributive tilt;  and appropriately-designed constraints can make the
degree of competition a policy variable which, moreover, can be varied by
subject and by region (Barnes and Barr (1988, Ch. 6);  Glennerster (1991); Le
Grand (1989)).
Funding Students
The lower part of Table 1 discusses the funding of students, again through the
generic methods of transfers, current earnings and loans.  Transfers can come
from the student's family (true in all countries), from industry (e.g.
sponsorship), from taxpayer grants (as in the UK) or from higher education
institutions themselves (more common in the USA).  A second type of transfer
is scholarships, i.e. a transfer related to the student's academic performance
(to oversimplify, grants are normally income-related, scholarships
performance-related).  Students may also receive transfers which are not
specific to the educational system, e.g. cash benefits for which students and
non-students are eligible.  Finally, students may receive transfers in the
form of tax expenditures, e.g. tax relief on certain types of educational
spending.
There are also various forms of in-kind transfer.  Assistance with
living expenses includes  subsidised accommodation, food or transport.
Accommodation can be subsidised by the student's family (if he/she is living
at home), by the taxpayer or by the university.  Second, and highly important,
are subsidised tuition fees, which are the major tax-funded transfer to
students in mainland Europe.
Student income also derives from current earnings whilst a student, a
common source in the USA, and increasingly common in Britain.10
With unsubsidised loans the source of student support is the student
him/herself, i.e. the student is redistributing from himself in later life to
himself during student days.  Subsidised loans are a mixture of loan and
implicit grant;  the source of support is in part the student himself and in
part the taxpayer (if it is the state which pays the subsidy).  As a practical
matter loans in most countries are subsidised, in some cases substantially
(for arguments against such subsidies, see Barr, 1991, pp. 161-2).
Historically loans in most countries have had mortgage repayments, and
the UK introduced such a scheme in 1990.  As discussed shortly, however,
Australia and Sweden have recently introduced loans with income-contingent
repayments.
The world, of course, does not always conform neatly with the simple
categorisation in Table 1.  There are sources of support other than the
beneficiaries, e.g. a named endowment, whose purpose is to perpetuate the name
of the benefactor.  But the categorisation gives a framework for simplifying
complex institutional data;  and it facilitates discussion of which packages
offer the most efficient and equitable forms of funding.
IV  POLICY IN THE OECD
The UK: A Botched Reform
Abstracting from a mass of detail (see Cave and Weale (1992) for further
discussion), policy is threefold.
1) A move towards a more market-oriented system of higher education (see
UK Department of Education and Science, 1991) implies inter alia that
institutional funding will come less from transfers and more from current
earnings in the form of fees and, separately, research grants and contracts
(i.e. a move from line 1 in Table 1, to line 2).  As argued earlier (though
the matter is controversial) such a move could increase the efficiency of
higher education by giving students and other consumers a greater role on the11
     
6 Even that figure is an under-estimate, in that it omits
any interest charge on the cumulative deficit over the 25
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demand side, and by allowing competition between institutions to facilitate
the supply-side response.  In reality, the centralising tendency of recent
years has, if anything, been exaggerated.
2) A stated desire for expansion without any significant increase in
public spending implies a move from tax-funding towards funding from students
and other private-sector sources (i.e. a move from column C to columns A and
B). In the late 1980s, only about 15 per cent of the relevant age range went
on to higher education, a smaller fraction than in any advanced industrialised
country (UK Department of Education and Science, 1988, Chart F).  A central
inconsistency in government policy is the introduction of competitive
pressures to expansion without either a significant increase in public
spending or policies to facilitate private expenditure.  Policy has therefore
failed completely to grasp the dilemma posed at the end of section I.
   3) The recent introduction of student loans (UK Department of Education
and Science, 1988) illustrates this failure precisely.  Students borrow
taxpayer money, with mortgage repayments.  Since the scheme introduces no
private funds, there is no public expenditure saving in the short- or medium
term (on the Government's own figures (Hansard, WA, 24 July 1989, col. 441)
the scheme produces no cumulative net saving for at least 25 years).
6  Thus
the scheme simultaneously harms access and yields no savings, and hence frees
no resources for expansion.  The introduction of private funds is central to
expansion of student numbers.  A loan scheme which combines private funding
with income-contingent repayments is proposed in Barr (1989).
The USA: The Finger-in-the-Dyke Approach
The funding of institutions is decentralised.  Alongside a large range of
private institutions, funded mainly by student fees and other forms of
earnings, is a range of state colleges and universities funded in part by12
transfers and in part by student fees.  The age-participation rate is about
40 per cent.  The major concern of US policy makers is not expansion or
access, but the quality of the system and its contribution to economic growth.
As discussed at the start of the paper, these problems are the result of a
system with limited public funding, coupled with no supply-side constraints.
Student funding derives largely from transfers from their families, from
current earnings and from various forms of loan.  The problems of student
loans in the USA are well-known (see Reischauer, 1989, pp. 34-42).  First, it
is unduly kind to talk about a loan 'system':  '[t]he complex range of grants
and loans from federal, state and campus sources is a major administrative
problem for most institutions.  Students seldom understand all that is
available' (UK Department of Education and Science, 1989, para. 123).
Mortgage repayments are the rule.  Interest subsidies are pervasive and
default rates high.  The combined effect of interest subsidies and defaults
is that the system is costly and of only questionable benefit in encouraging
participation from lower-income groups (Bosworth, Carron and Rhyne, 1987, Ch.
6).
Reischauer (1989) proposes a system with income-contingent repayments
piggy-backed onto the federal social security system.  To date there has been
no action.
Sweden:  The Evolutionary Approach
In Sweden, as in most of the rest of mainland Europe, institutions receive
substantial tax funding, with only a limited role for fees.  Student support
in the 1960s was mainly in the form of a tax-funded grant plus parental
support.  A loan scheme with interest subsidies and mortgage repayments was
introduced in the mid-1960s, which over time took on an increasing fraction
of student support.  Worries about student indebtedness led to major reform
in 1989 including an increase in tax-funded student support, the abolition of
mandatory parental contributions, a reduction in interest subsidies, and the
introduction of income-contingent repayments.  Sweden, in short, introduced13
loans early, learned from its mistakes and, through a process of evolution,
moved towards an increasingly well-designed system (for details, see Morris,
1989).
Australia: The Revolutionary Approach
Until 1989, institutions were mainly tax funded.  Expansion and improved
access entered the policy agenda in the mid 1980s, and the recommendations of
the Wran Report (Australia, 1988), as amended, took effect in January 1989.
The core of the reform package was a Higher Education Contribution Scheme,
whereby students became liable to a contribution intended to be about one
fifth of the average tuition fee (i.e. the contribution does not vary across
subjects).  Students have the option of paying the contribution on enrolment
at a 15 per cent discount.  Otherwise the contribution is paid out of a loan
at a zero real interest rate.  Repayment is suspended for individuals with
annual earnings below the national average.  Thereafter, repayment is 1 per
cent of taxable income, rising to 2 per cent and, at the highest incomes, to
3 per cent, collected through the tax system.
Though often represented as a tax, the scheme is properly thought of as
a loan:  it is voluntary, since the fee charge can be paid upon enrolment;
and the additional contribution is 'switched off' once the charge has been
paid.  Several points are noteworthy:  the revenue from the scheme will
finance expansion of higher education;  and repayments are income-contingent
explicitly to avoid compromising access (see Hope and Miller, 1988).  In the
latter aim, research findings strongly suggest, the scheme has been successful
(Chapman, 1992, Ch. 12).
V  CONCLUSION
Overall conclusions are twofold.  First, higher education funding should be
designed as a coherent strategy, not as a patchwork of ad hoc policies.
Second, funding should not rely excessively on any one source.  This is not14
a very dramatic conclusion, but non-economists seem to have a strong (and
usually inappropriate) attraction to corner solutions.
The high public-sector cost per student, through Treasury control of
public expenditure, kept the higher-education sector in the UK small.  In
contrast, higher education in the USA is substantially funded from the private
sector and faces much less constraint.  This is the dilemma posed earlier:
the greater the public-sector subsidy to higher education the greater the
pressure on the system not to grow.  There are two possible solutions.  One
is to keep expenditure constant, but admit more students, i.e. to trade off
quality against increased enrolment.  The second is to set up mechanisms which
allow a greater role for private-sector funds.
As a response to the tradeoff between size, quality and public
expenditure, countries like Britain and Australia, with substantially tax-
funded systems, are seeking to introduce more private funding.  Countries like
Sweden, whose reliance on loans in the past was excessive, are moving in the
opposite direction.  Any move away from tax funding, however, must rest on a
loan scheme which (a) does not deter access and (b) brings in private funds.
Loans, from both an efficiency and an equity perspective, are thus the key to
reform.
London School of Economics and Political Science
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  Table 1:  SOURCES AND TYPES OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
      A STUDENT
   MECHANISMS (i) Him/herself (ii) Parent
_________________________________________________________________________
 FUNDING FOR INSTITUTIONS
  1 TRANSFERS
a Block recurrent grant
b Capital grant
c Tax expenditure





  3 LOANS
a Commercial
b Subsidised
 FUNDING FOR STUDENTS 
  4 TRANSFERS




    Subsidies
d Subsidised tuition fees
e Subsidised accommodation
f Subsidised food
  5 CURRENT EARNINGS
a From university
b From other sources
  6 LOANS
    Commercial
a Mortgage
b Income-related





         SOURCES
_________________________________________________________________________
   B  PRIVATE  C TAXPAYER        D OTHER
   SECTOR    (i) University (ii) Philanthropy
_________________________________________________________________________